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DRAWING THE LINE: WHITFORD V. GILL AND THE SEARCH
FOR MANAGEABLE PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
STANDARDS
Abigail Aguilera*

I. INTRODUCTION
The constitution grants legislatures the authority to create voting
districts and apportion representatives among them.1 This grant of power
to bodies imbued with political interests inevitably presents the
possibility that politics and partisan interests will enter the districting
equation. However, deciding claims that are unfairly influenced by
partisan politics presents a difficult problem for the Supreme Court. As
such, the federal courts have largely refused to hear issues of
malapportionment and gerrymandering.2 Malapportionment is defined
as an unequal population distribution across voting districts so that the
votes of people in lower population districts have greater influence on
electoral outcomes than those in more densely populated districts.3
Gerrymandered districts can have populations of equal sizes but the
manner in which the district is drawn affects the weight of a person’s
vote.4
In the 1960’s, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
malapportionment and the measure of constitutional representation
required in districting,5 and in the 1980’s the Court first addressed the
issue of partisan gerrymandering.6 However, ever since entering this
fray, the Court’s articulations regarding partisan gerrymandering have
been confused at best, and at worst an implicit license for district
drafters to freely engage in extensive partisan gerrymandering.
In Whitford v. Gill,7 a three-judge district court for the Western
District of Wisconsin addressed claims of partisan gerrymandering by

* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
2. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
3. Mitchell Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 Tex. L. Rev 781, 785 (2004-2005);
“Malaportionment involves the creation or preservation of electoral districts of different population
sizes, so that the ration of representatives to voters varies across districts. Gerrymanders can involve
districts of roughly equivalent, even equal population, sizes.” Id. at 785 n.20.
4. Id. at 785.
5. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (holding that district malapportionment was a
justiciable issue); Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (establishing that the Constitution
required that each person’s vote carries the same weight).
6. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986).
7. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
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the Republican controlled state legislature.8 The Wisconsin district court
utilized a three-part test briefed by the plaintiffs as an appropriate
measure of impermissible partisan gerrymandering of the state’s voting
districts.9
In light of the Whitford decision, this case note addresses why the
three-part test applied in that case promises an appropriate measure for
determining impermissible partisan gerrymandering. Section II of this
note explores the history of partisan gerrymandering in subsection (a)
and then addresses the circumstances and facts of Whitford in subsection
(b). Section III addresses why the standard applied in Whitford presents
a judicially manageable standard that should be adopted for evaluation
of partisan gerrymandering claims. Section III first examines the
important need to address claims of partisan gerrymanders, subsection
(a), and then addresses the advantages of the Whitford test as compared
with possible standards the Court has expressed a desire for in the past,
in subsection (b). Finally, Section III concludes by addressing the added
advantage of the Whitford standard in dealing with partisan
gerrymandering and technologic advances in district drawing.
II. BACKGROUND
This section first explores the history of gerrymandering, as well as
the facts of Whitford v. Gill. Subsection (a) of this section defines and
explains the origins of gerrymandering and the rise of the justiciability
of district malapportionment. Additionally, subsection (a) seeks to
provide some context regarding partisan gerrymandering and the Court’s
recent jurisprudence in this area. Part (b) of this section addresses the
case of Whitford v. Gill, what the Wisconsin court decided in that matter
and its relevance to partisan gerrymandering.
A. What Is Gerrymandering?
The term gerrymandering originated in 1812 when, the then
Massachusetts Governor, Elbridge Gerry, drew a voting district
resembling a salamander for the benefit of his own political party.10
Thus, gerrymandering is the process of dividing districts within a state
or territory, but in such a way that achieves a political or personal gain.11
Gerrymandering can, and has been, employed over time to achieve a
8. See id. at 853-56.
9. Id. at 854-855.
10. Whitney M. Eaton, Where Do We Draw the Line? Partisan Gerrymandering and the State of
Texas, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (2006.)
11. Id.
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variety of nefarious goals. Not only have voting districts been
challenged as attempts to achieve certain political majorities in
legislative bodies,12 but also for impermissibly employing racial
considerations in districting.13
1. The Rise of Challenges to District Apportionment
For more than 174 years14 the Supreme Court treated cases
challenging district apportionments as non-justiciable “political
questions”15 and would not adjudicate them.16 From the end of the
industrial revolution and through World War II, large population
disparities developed between voting districts, exacerbating the problem
of district malapportionment.17 Left unchecked, politicians had little
incentive to redistrict, as failure to change districts would maintain the
status quo.18 The Court’s approach to malapportionment claims during
this period was best characterized by Justice Frankfurter, who warned
that the Court “ought not to enter this political thicket.”19
Not until Baker v. Carr20 did the Supreme Court find that claims
regarding the unconstitutionality of legislative apportionment presented
a justiciable question.21 The outcome of Baker lead to a string of cases
alleging vote dilution due to district apportionment that violated the
equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.22
In subsequent cases, the Court elaborated on the Baker standard by
finding that the notion of equality of votes among voters was to be
embodied in the one person, one vote standard.23 One person, one vote
reflects the notion that equal representation means that each person’s
vote carries equal weight and is rooted in the idea that voting is a
12. See Vieth v. Jublirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
13. See. e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
14. Eaton, supra note 10, at 1196.
15. A political question arises when a case presents a matter that under the Constitution is
committed to another branch of the government which the Court adjudicating would impinge on the
separation of powers. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
16. E.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
17. Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Synder Jr. THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE
VOTE AND TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 39-40 (2008); See also William F. Swindler,
Reapportionment: Revisionism or Revolution, 43 N.C. L. REV. 55, 60-61 (1964-1965) (discussing how
the 1930 decennial census confirmed the shifting population trends in the years leading up to World War
I from rural to urban populations).
18. Ansolabehere, supra note 17, at 40.
19. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21. Id. at 237.
22. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
23. Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
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fundamental right that enables the preservation of other rights,24 and that
the weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be dependent on where that person
happens to live.25 In addition to requiring that voting redistricting
standards adhere to the one person, one vote standard, other permissible
traditional redistricting criteria have been recognized as evidence of
permissible district apportionment.26 Such criteria include geographic
continuity and compactness of districts, preserving communities of
interest, and nesting.27
2. Issues with Partisan Gerrymandering in Particular
As its name alludes, the concept of partisan gerrymandering springs
from the idea that district lines were drawn in such a way so as to favor
a certain political party over another by ensuring victories in those
districts. Thus, “partisan gerrymandering is gaining through
discretionary districting an unjustifiable advantage for one political
party as opposed to the others.”28
There are two methods generally used to achieve partisan
gerrymandering when drawing districting lines: district drawers may
either “pack” or “crack” districts.29 Packing a district allows for
concentration of one party’s supporters in only a few districts; thus,
while the party wins an overwhelming majority in those districts, the
districts are few.30 Conversely, cracking requires district lines to be
drawn in such a way that the opposing party’s voters are split into large
minorities across various districts and are unable to achieve a majority
of the votes in any district.31 District drawers wishing to achieve partisan
gerrymandering will often employ both of these techniques to achieve
their aims.32
Partisan gerrymandering often leads to litigation because it
undermines the notion of equality amongst voters.33 In the United States,
representation is divided among geographic regions, with elections in

24. Christopher M. Burke, THE APPEARANCE OF EQUALITY: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING,
REDISTRICTING, AND THE SUPREME COURT 60 (1999); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560.
25. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567.
26. Ethan Weiss, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Elusive Standard, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
693, 697 (2013).
27. Id.
28. Charles Backstrom, et al., Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan
Gerrymandering Applied to Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1121,1129 (1977-78).
29. Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403, 406 (1993).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
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these geographic regions typically based on a winner-take-all system.34
Thus, if partisan gerrymandering occurred in the drawing of district
lines, then a party can exploit the winner-take-all system to achieve a
majority of votes in each district, while still representing a minority of
the popular vote.35 This outcome is problematic for members of a
political group that fall victim to partisan gerrymandering, who attempt
to bring claims based on this disadvantage. Unfortunately, the history of
these claims in the Court has resulted in a string of plurality opinions
that articulated confused and divided views of the issue.
3. Troubles Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering
For many years after the pronouncement of Baker, the Court did not
address the question of partisan gerrymandering, instead finding many
cases that presented questions of pure partisan gerrymandering as not
justiciable.36 However, during this time the Court in Gaffney v.
Cummings37 noted that, even though a districting plan might be
acceptable under the one person, one vote equal population distribution
standards, it could still be unconstitutional because the districts were
created in such a way so as to dilute the voting strength of certain racial
or political groups.38
When the Court finally directly addressed the issue of partisan
gerrymandering, it did so in the case of Davis v. Bandemer.39 Bandemer
involved claims that a 1981 state apportionment diluted votes of Indiana
Democrats in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.40 The district
court invalidated the districting statute, finding that the plan had a
discriminatory effect on Democratic voters by adversely affecting their
proportional voting influence and that such a discriminatory plan could
not be tolerated.41 Upon review, the Supreme Court declined to say that
claims based on partisan gerrymandering were never justiciable.42
Instead, while justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, such claims
must, as a threshold matter, demonstrate discriminatory vote dilution in
order to establish a prima facie case under that clause.43 The Court then
34. Weiss, supra note 26, at 696.
35. See id.
36. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 121 (1986).
37. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
38. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (quoting Forston v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,
439 (1965)).
39. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
40. Id. at 113.
41. Id. at 117.
42. Id. at 113, 124.
43. Id. at 143.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

5

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 8

780

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

reversed the district court ruling, finding that the showing of an adverse
effect in Bandemer did not meet the threshold requirement for
establishing a prima facie case.44
However, eighteen years later, the Court changed course on this issue
in Vieth v. Jubelirer.45 In Vieth, a four-justice plurality, led by Justice
Scalia, announced that the issue of partisan gerrymandering was in fact
not justiciable, and that Bandemer was wrongly decided.46 The Court
criticized the ruling enunciated by the plurality in Bandemer on the
grounds that it had only lead to years of confusion in lower courts, and
that it presented a judicially unmanageable standard.47 Justice Kennedy
provided the needed fifth vote to create a majority in Vieth, but not
because he believed partisan gerrymanders to be non-justiciable (like the
plurality) but because he did not believe a manageable standard had
been present in Vieth.48 Kennedy noted the unfairness of categorically
deciding that partisan gerrymandering cases cannot be heard, while still
addressing other types of apportionment cases.49 He concluded that
because “no such standard [had] emerged in [Vieth] should not be taken
to prove that none will emerge in the future.”50
Only two months after Veith was decided in 2004, the Supreme Court
decided Cox. v. Larios51 in 2005 and then League of United Latin
American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry52 in 2006. The collective effect of
the decisions in these cases only muddied the waters further regarding
partisan gerrymandering. In Cox, the Court affirmed a Georgia district
court’s ruling that the legislative apportionment plan for both the
Georgia’s House of Representatives and Senate violated the one person,
one vote principle.53 However, Stevens, in his concurrence, emphasized
the notion that the present lack of judicially manageable standards to
address the issue of partisan gerrymandering did not “justify a refusal
‘to condemn even the most blatant violations of a state legislature’s
fundamental duty to govern impartially.’”54
In LULAC, claims were brought forth alleging that the Texas middecennial redistricting plan constituted a partisan gerrymander as well as

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 113, 143.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Id. at 281.
Id. at 281-83.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 311.
542 U.S. 947 (2004).
548 U.S. 399 (2006).
Cox, 542 U.S. at 947.
Id. at 950-51 (J. Stevens, concurring (quoting Vieth v. Jublirer, 541 U.S. 267, 341 (2004))).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/8

6

Aguilera: Drawing the Line: Whitford v. Gill and the Search for Manageable

2018] MANAGEABLE PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING STANDARDS

781

a violation the protections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.55 In regard
to the partisan gerrymandering claim, the appellants argued that the middecennial redistricting plan enacted by the Texas legislature was only
motivated by partisan objectives, violating the Equal Protection Clause
and the First Amendment.56 The Court produced yet another confusing
discussion on partisan gerrymandering. Justice Stevens dissented and
suggested a new approach for managing partisan gerrymandering, while
Ginsburg and Breyer continued to assert that such claims were
justiciable.57
Thus, while the Supreme Court has attempted to stay out of fights
regarding partisan gerrymandering claims, “[t]he Justices have
maintained they have authority over these matters, but have failed to
establish a simple standard analogous to one person, one vote that would
clear up the controversies.”58 Rather than clarifying the issue of partisan
gerrymandering, the Court’s recent jurisprudence on the issue since
Bandemer has only created confusion. With no clear statement on the
issue, due to the Court’s ability to produce only a string of plurality
opinions on the matter, lower courts were left to question what standards
should be applied.
B. The Case of Whitford v. Gill59
1. Voting and Apportionment in Wisconsin
In the state of Wisconsin, voting districts are apportioned by the
legislature after each decennial census.60 From about 1980 until 2010,
reapportionment in Wisconsin was marked by periodic court
intervention and court-implemented districting plans.61 However, in
2010 Wisconsin Republicans controlled both bodies of the Wisconsin
legislature and the governorship, leading them to believe that a new
legislatively enacted redistricting plan was possible.62
The Republican leaders in the legislature appointed staff to work on
this new apportionment plan with local attorneys and Professor Michael
Keith Gaddie from the University of Oklahoma.63 Using redistricting
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

League of United Latin American Citizens, 548 U.S. at 408.
Id. at 416-17.
See Weiss, supra note 26, at 705.
Ansolabehere, supra note 17, at 247.
218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 846-47.
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software and the help of Professor Gaddie, a new district map was
created, the “Team Map.”64 Professor Gaddie’s analysis of the Team
Map revealed that under this plan, Republicans would maintain majority
control of Wisconsin in any possible voting scenario.65 This plan was
subsequently introduced as a bill and was passed by the Senate and
Assembly and signed into law by the Governor as Wisconsin Act 43.66
2. The Claim Against Act 43
The plaintiffs in Whitford resided in various counties throughout
Wisconsin, all of them supporters of the Democratic Party in Wisconsin,
as well as almost always voting for Democratic candidates during
elections.67 The defendants were all members of the Wisconsin Election
Committee.68
The plaintiffs claimed that Act 43 violated their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights because Act 43 discriminated against Democratic
voters by diluting their votes as compared with Republican voters.69 In
evaluating the validity of the plaintiffs’ claim, the court engaged in a
detailed analysis of case law addressing both malapportionment and
partisan gerrymandering claims.70 The court concluded that, while still
developing and in a state of flux, the case law did reveal that the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause protected a citizen from
discrimination in regard to the weight of the vote based on the citizen’s
political preferences.71
The district court then stated, “the First Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause prohibit a redistricting scheme which (1) intended to
place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual
citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and
(3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds.”72 The
court then applied this standard to the facts of the case.
3. Discriminatory Intent or Purpose in Redistricting
The first prong of the test, as announced in Whitford, requires that
there be a showing that discriminatory intent or purpose motivated the
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 851.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 853-54.
Id.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 864-83.
Id. at 883-84.
Id.
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redistricting plan in question.73 At the same time the court in Whitford
recognized that some partisanship was permissible in the drawing of
district lines but analyzed when the influence of this partisanship
crossed from acceptable into excessive and discriminatory.74
The defendants argued that because Act 43 complied with traditional
principles of apportionment that there was no discriminatory intent as a
matter of law.75 The court rejected this assertion and instead focused on
the events leading up to the enactment of Act 43 for indications that the
drafters had employed impermissible discriminatory intent when
creating the new districting map.76 Evidence from the trial indicated that
the drafters worked with Professor Gaddie and his regression models in
order to generate a map that would ensure Republican Party control of
the state legislature for the next decennial period.77 The court rejected
the defendants’ claims that the evidence was inadequate to establish
discriminatory intent,78 and instead found that the focal point of the
drafters, when creating the new districting map, was to ensure
Republican control in the legislature.79 The court then concluded that
Act 43 “had as one of its objectives entrenching the Republicans’
control of the Assembly.”80
4. Discriminatory Effect of the Redistricting
The court found that the discriminatory effect of Act 43’s
apportionment was evidenced through the election results of the
Wisconsin elections of 2012 and 2014. 81 In the 2012 election, the
Republicans won sixty seats in the Assembly, but only 48.6 percent of
the statewide vote; and in the 2014 election they won sixty-three seats
with 52 percent of the vote.82 Moreover, in the 2012 election,
Democrats won 51.4 percent of the statewide vote while only winning
thirty-nine Assembly seats; and in 2014, they won forty-eight percent of
the vote, which garnered them just thirty-six seats.83
73. Id. at 884-85.
74. Id. at 885-87.
75. Id. at 887.
76. Id. at 890.
77. Id. at 891.
78. The defendants alleged that the evidence was inadequate because (1) there were errors in the
models making them unreliable, (2) the models were merely analysis of the averages of past elections
applied to new districts, and (3) that the partisan intent in this case was not invidious because the
districts complied with traditional districting principles. Id at 895-897.
79. Id at 897-98.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 898-99.
83. Id. at 901.
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The court also found the plaintiffs’ use of the efficiency gap (“EG”)
as intriguing evidence that the Democrat’s voting rights were burdened
under Act 43.84 The plaintiffs demonstrated at trial that, based on the
EG, the Republican Party won thirteen and ten Assembly seats in excess
of what they likely would have won based on the percentage of the vote
garnered in the 2012 and 2014 elections, respectively.85 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs established that Act 43 burdened
Democratic voters for two election cycles by impeding their ability to
translate votes into seats.86
5. Justification
Finally, under the third prong, the court evaluated whether the
partisan effects of Act 43 were justified under “legitimate state
prerogatives and neutral factors that are implicated in the districting
process.”87 To this end, the defendants established that Wisconsin’s
geography did give the Republican party a natural, but slight, advantage
in districting, as Democratic voters were concentrated in mostly urban
areas.88 However, the court rejected the defendants’ explanation as an
adequate justification for the partisan effect produced by Act 43.89 The
court noted that the plan’s drafters generated multiple district reports
that met legitimate districting criteria and did not create the same
partisan advantage as the map that ultimately became Act 43.90 Based on
this evidence, the court concluded that the burden for Democratic voters
created by Act 43 was not justifiable under the circumstances.91

84. The EG measures the amount of “packing” and “cracking” of a given party’s voters in any a
district. It compares the number of “wasted votes” for each party by looking at the number of votes cast
for a losing candidate in each district and the number of votes cast for the winning candidate in each
district over the fifty percent needed to win. The EG is the difference between the number of “wasted”
votes for each party divided by the overall all number of votes cast in the election. Therefore, the more
favorable a party’s EG is the less votes that party “wasted” in the election, meaning fewer votes were
cast in excess of what was needed to win a district. Thus, the votes were used more efficiently by one
party and allowed that party greater ease in translating votes cast into legislative seats. Id. at 903-04; see
also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency
Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015).
85. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 905-06.
86. Id. at 910.
87. Id. at 911.
88. Id. at 911-19.
89. Id. at 926-27.
90. Id. at 923-24.
91. Id..
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6. Outcome and Remedies of Whitford
The court deferred on granting remedies, and instead ordered
briefings on the appropriate remedy and evidence thereof.92 After
receiving and reviewing the parties’ responses to this order, the court
then made a ruling on the appropriate remedy for the case. 93 While both
parties agreed that an injunction against further use of Act 43 districting
was appropriate, they disagreed as to who would redraw the district
map.94 The plaintiffs urged the court to redistrict in this case; however,
the court deferred to the legislature to redistrict the map.95 Balancing the
harm already suffered by the people of Wisconsin under this
apportionment plan with the defendants’ right to appeal before the
Supreme Court, the district court set November 1, 2017, as the date for
enactment of a contingent replacement districting plan.96 Finally, based
on considerations of harm to the plaintiffs and the defendants, the court
declined to stay its judgment pending appeal of the case to the Supreme
Court.97
III. DISCUSSION
With the Whitford standard now established in Wisconsin, the next
stop for the parties will be the Supreme Court.98 However, with the
general sense of confusion surrounding the Court’s jurisprudence on
partisan gerrymandering, the outcome of any such appeal is uncertain.
Therefore, the object of this section will be to evaluate how the test
articulated in Whitford presents a manageable standard that the Court
should adopt to adjudicate claims of partisan gerrymandering.
Therefore, subsection (a) first addresses the importance of adjudicating
partisan gerrymandering claims; and subsection (b) discusses some
important factors to have in a judicially manageable standard for
adjudicating partisan gerrymanders claims and why the Whitford test
presents a standard that the Court should adopt.

92. Id. at 930.
93. Whitford v. Gill, 15-cv-421-bbc 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11380, at *2 (W.D. Wis. 2017).
94. Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11380, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 27,
2017).
95. Id. at *1-4.
96. Id. at *6.
97. Id. at *5-6.
98. Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161, 2017 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs Lexis 1111 (2017); District courts of
three judges are required to be convened when challenges are made to the constitutionality of
apportionment of either congressional districts of statewide legislative bodies. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1984).
Decisions from a three-judge district court decision are appealable directly to the Supreme Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (1948).
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A. The Dangers of Continued Inaction and Confusion
Critics argue that the problem of partisan gerrymandering is not likely
to self-perpetuate and, therefore, the lack of judicially manageable
standards is unproblematic.99 Difficulties such as achieving and
maintaining control of both state congressional bodies and the
governorship, as well as shifting demographics and risk-avoidance of
legislators are arguable checks on partisan gerrymandering.100 However,
the continuous litigation in this area points to a different conclusion, one
in which the problems of partisan gerrymandering will continue to affect
electoral processes, and the continued presence of partisan
gerrymandering in our electoral system should not be confused with
normalcy or benignity.
1. Partisan Gerrymandering Is a Continuous Harm to the Democratic
Process
The Court’s continuous schism over issues of partisan
gerrymandering likely allows the practice to flourish and continue
indefinitely as it remains unchecked. The Court’s inability to address the
issue of partisan gerrymandering has sent the message that “as long as a
plan was based on ‘political behavior,’ virtually anything was
constitutionally permissible.”101 This is because cases have
demonstrated that such gerrymanders can be perpetrated in districting
with no threat of invalidation by the Court.102
This trend is particularly troublesome when considering that elected
officials are meant to be the representatives of the people, and that
“[g]errymandered districts create less responsive members of
Congress.”103 Partisan gerrymandering gives elected officials little
incentive to work towards majority values or work with other members
of the legislature, because reelection is assured due to the district
gerrymandering protecting them.104 This situation also exacerbates the
evermore-polarized ideological positions of representatives who need
not compete to maintain their seats, and it reduces the incentive to
99. Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the
Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1985).
100. See Id.
101. Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable
Standard and other reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 253
(2009).
102. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
103. Joshua Butera, Partisan Gerrymandering and Qualifications Clause, 95 B.U. L. REV. 303,
310 (2015).
104. Id.
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compromise with other political viewpoints.105 Moreover, partisan
gerrymandering leads to “the loss of democratic legitimacy that
presumably follows from free and fair elections because people feel
their votes no longer effect the outcomes of elections.”106
2. Technological Advancements Continue to Enable Partisan
Gerrymandering
The continuing development of technologies such as computers may
greatly facilitate the ability of political parties to conduct partisan
gerrymandering for their benefit. For example, sophisticated computer
software was heavily employed in Whitford in the drafting of the district
maps.107 In the past, the use of computers in partisan gerrymandering
was dismissed as simply “exaggerated fears of what unscrupulous
politicians can do with powerful computers.”108 Even the dissent in
Whitford argued that “[t]he idea of some kind of high-tech stealth
gerrymander is nothing more than a bugaboo.”109
However, Whitford demonstrates that such technologies can present
particularly invidious partisan gerrymandering because they allow for
the creation of gerrymandered districts that still conform to traditional
criteria that typically indicates the presence of permissible voting
districts.110 Even the popular media has commented on the pervasive use
of computers in creating very effective partisan gerrymandering and the
lasting effects of such practices.111
B. What a Judicially Manageable Standard Should Look Like: Indicia
from the Court
Over the years, various members of the Court have tried to articulate
what a judicially manageable standard for partisan gerrymandering
should look like. This section compiles some of the salient concerns that
emerged over the course of the Court’s thirty-year struggle with partisan
gerrymandering since Bandemer. These factors will then be measured
105. Id. at 310-11.
106. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 611
(2002-2003).
107. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
108. Lowenstein, supra note 99, at 67.
109. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 943 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
110. Supra note 66-68 and accompanying text.
111. Bernard Grofman, The Supreme Court Will Examine Partisan Gerrymandering in 2017,
WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/31/the-supreme-courtwill-examine-partisan-gerrymandering-in-2017-that-could-change-the-votingmap/?utm_term=.5c05b11a132e, (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
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against the actions of the district court in Whitford. This section
articulates why Whitford represents a desirable combination of
previously articulated standards for measuring partisan gerrymanders,
but also addresses the issue of how the Court should deal with the
influence of technology in the area of partisan gerrymandering. Part (i)
of this section walks through how Whitford compares with the Court’s
previous articulation for partisan gerrymandering standards, and part (ii)
addresses some of the advantages that Whitford brings to bear in its test
for partisan gerrymandering regarding technology.
1. Partisan Gerrymandering Standards as Compared to Whitford
a. Looking to the First Amendment in Addition to Equal Protection
Clause for Support
An alternative basis for approaching partisan gerrymandering claims
has been to evaluate such claims under the First Amendment.112 Justice
Stevens articulated this in both Vieth and LULAC. In his dissent in
Vieth, Stevens suggested that the plurality erred when it said that strict
scrutiny should never be applied when evaluating a claim of partisan
gerrymandering, and instead noted that political association can be
subject to strict scrutiny on First Amendment grounds.113 For Stevens,
“political belief and association constitute the core of those activities
protected by the First Amendment.”114 Stevens reiterated this claim in
LULAC, noting that the protections of both the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the freedom of political belief and
association guaranteed by the First Amendment “reflect the fundamental
duty of the sovereign to govern impartially.”115
While criticisms have been levied against a First Amendment
approach116 support also arises for the approach because of its
preference for a “commitment to neutrality as embodied in the contentbased viewpoint discrimination analysis.”117 Moreover, as the Court has
expressed such an approach, “[a]t worst would produce results no worse
than presently yielded with Equal Protection Clause and at best it would
112. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of people
to peacefully assemble.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
113. Vieth v. Jublirer, 541 U.S. 267, 324 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 324 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976)).
115. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 462 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. David Schultz, The Party’s Over: Partisan Gerrymandering and the First Amendment, 36
CAP. U. L. REV 1, 22-26 (2007) (surveying various critical responses to the suggestion that the First
Amendment could be used as a supportive basis for partisan gerrymander claims).
117. Id. at 53.
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resolve a vexing problem that the Court has sought to resolve since
Bandemer.”118
The plaintiffs in Whitford brought their partisan gerrymandering
claim, not only under the guarantee of equal protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also under claims that Act 43 burdened their rights
under the First Amendment.119 The plaintiffs claimed that the
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering “unreasonably [burdened]
their First Amendment rights of association and free speech.”120
Bringing partisan gerrymandering claims under the First Amendment,
allows the Court to apply a strict scrutiny analysis because of the
protections granted for view-point based discrimination.121 Partisan
claims brought under First Amendment grounds may be more apt to
receive a strict scrutiny review and, thus, more protection.
The First Amendment basis in Whitford also addresses one of the
complaints of Judge Griesbach’s dissent in Whitford. The dissent took
issue with the fact that the partisan gerrymandering in Whitford did not
“entrench” the Republican Party, a typical indicator of possible partisan
gerrymandering for the Supreme Court in the past and also an indicator
of gerrymandering that violates the protections of the Equal Protection
Clause.122 Traditionally, the Court considered entrenchment to be when
a party with only a minority of voter support committed gerrymandering
in a way so as to maintain control of a legislature.123 Thus, the Court
looked for the situation in which “a majority of voters in a state are
consistently deprived of the opportunity to control a branch of
government.”124 Therefore, under a First Amendment claim the presence
of entrenchment may not be necessary to support a finding of partisan
gerrymandering.
b. Partisan Gerrymandering Should be Examined at the District Court
Level
In Vieth, Justice Stevens argued that cases for partisan
gerrymandering should be examined at the district court level and on a
district-by-district basis.125 Stevens favored a district-by-district
approach because he believed the harm of gerrymandering to be more
118. Id. at 26.
119. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 855 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
120. Id.
121. Supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
122. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 937-38.
123. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 360 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006).
124. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 937.
125. Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 at 328-29. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cognizable when affecting members of a specific district.126 Stevens
asserted, “the injury is only cognizable when stated by voters who reside
in that particular district, otherwise the ‘plaintiff would be asserting only
a generalized grievance against governmental conduct of which he or
she does not approve.’”127
The dissent in Whitford seized upon the fact that, at the district court
level, the plaintiffs could not point to individual district gerrymandering,
but instead relied on data from the entire state to make their case.128 The
dissent found this lack of gerrymandering in districts to be an important
factor for denying the plaintiffs’ claims.129 However, the Court’s past
reliance on irregularly shaped districts or the offending of traditional
districting criteria can no longer be the sole criteria for evaluating such
claims. Simply put, “the commonly held view that reliance on formal
criteria such as compactness or equal population can prevent
gerrymandering is simply wrong.”130
Part of the reason the gerrymandering in Whitford was so invidious is
because the drafters went to such great lengths using computers to
purposefully draw districts that would not raise any red flags but that
would still achieve maximum Republican Party control in the legislature
of Wisconsin. As one scholar noted, “[g]errymandering may take place
even though districts are perfectly regular in appearance.”131 As
technology improves, so must the standards used to evaluate partisan
gerrymandering claims, as this problem will likely only become worse,
especially if the Court cannot articulate a standard for how to deal with
partisan gerrymandering. Therefore, looking to individual districts as
indicators of gerrymandering may be insufficient and partisan
gerrymandering will be better evaluated in the full context of the history
of the districting plan, as was the case in Whitford.
c. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Should Demonstrate a
Discriminatory Intent or Purpose on the Part of the Drafters
The justices have articulated one common theme: the need for
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the intent or purpose of the challenged
redistricting plan was for a discriminatory purpose.132 A showing of
126. Id. at 330-31.
127. Id at 330.
128. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 939-40.
129. See id.
130. Bernad Grofman, Criteria for Districting a Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77,
88 (1985-1986).
131. Id. at 91.
132. Vieth v. Jublirer, 541 U.S. 267, 333-36 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 346 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 475,76 (2006) (Stevens,
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discriminatory intent or purpose has always been important to the Court
as proper means to demarcate the line between permissible and
impermissible partisan favoritism.133 In his concurrence in LULAC,
Stevens attempted to clarify this intent standard from Vieth to a
predominant purpose standard in LULAC;134 specifically, he wrote,
“when a plaintiff can prove that a legislature’s predominant motive in
drawing a particular district was to disadvantage a politically salient
group, and that the decision has the intended effect, the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights have been violated.”135
Additionally, in Vieth, Souter articulated a five-part test of which the
first four factors established evidence of intent of the party conducting
the partisan gerrymandering.136 The first four parts of this test would
require a plaintiff to demonstrate he or she was a member of a politically
cohesive group; that the district of which he was a member disregarded
traditional districting criteria (contiguity, compactness, conformity with
geographic features, and respect for political subdivisions); and that
there was a specific correlation between the deviations from traditional
districting criteria and the distribution of the population of this group.
Once demonstrating those three requirements, the plaintiff would then
need to present the Court with a hypothetical district of which his
residence was a part that adhered to the traditional districting
principles.137 Finally, the fifth part of the test would require that the
plaintiff demonstrate that “the defendants acted intentionally to
manipulate the shape of the district in order to pack or crack [the
plaintiff’s] group.”138 Though as one criticism points out these factors
fail to pinpoint what type of harm they are meant to detect.139 The main
takeaway here is that the element of discriminatory intent should be a
part of any standard meant to manage the problem of partisan
gerrymandering.
The three-part test presented in Whitford incorporates a consideration
for discriminatory intent or purpose. The proof of discriminatory intent
in Whitford was especially important as the defendants claimed that such
intent did not matter if the districts still adhered to traditional districting
principles, as they did under Act 43.140 The district court noted that
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884-91 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
134. Weiss, supra note 26, at 714; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 474 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
135. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 474 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 at 346-48 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 346-50.
138. Id at 350.
139. Weiss, supra note 26, at 715.
140. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 888 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
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simple reliance on traditional districting principles was insufficient
when evaluating discriminatory intent.141
Instead, the court in
Whitford focused on the mapmakers’ intent to create a map that
entrenched Republican Party control by drawing the districting map in
such a way that ensured continued Republican control of the Wisconsin
legislature.142 Even the dissent in Whitford admitted that “[i]t is almost
beyond question that the Republican staff members who drew the Act
43 maps intended to benefit Republican candidates.”143 The
discriminatory intent in Whitford was most certainly demonstrated by
the plaintiffs’ evidence, under the circumstances presented in which
sophisticated software was used to draw the districts; and it was more
appropriate than relying on traditional districting principles, as the test
Souter articulated in Vieth would require.144
d. Judicially Manageable Standards Should Measure a Discriminatory
Effect or Burden
A showing of discriminatory effect or burden placed on the plaintiff
bringing a partisan gerrymandering claim has also been a salient feature
of proposed standards for partisan gerrymandering articulated by the
Court. For example, in LULAC, Justice Stevens proposed that to
establish the effects of partisan gerrymandering the plaintiff would need
to demonstrate three factors being met:145 (1) the plaintiff’s candidate
would have won the election under the previous districting plan; (2) the
plaintiff’s residence is now in a district that is a “safe seat” for the other
party’s member; and (3) the new district is less compact than the
previous one.146
The second factor of the test applied in Whitford went to the issue of
discriminatory effects of Act 43. An important factor in evaluating
discriminatory effect for the court in Whitford was that two elections
had taken place since the districts in Act 43 were put in place.147 In both
the 2012 and 2014 elections, Democrats garnered a much higher
percentage of the vote as compared to the seats that they actually won
based on that voting percentage.148 As Justice Kennedy articulated in
LULAC, a districting plan “that more closely reflects the distribution of
141. Id. at 888-89.
142. See id. at 894-96.
143. Id. at 934.
144. Supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
145. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 476 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id.
147. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 902.
148. Supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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state party power seems a less likely vehicle for partisan
discrimination.”149 The court in Whitford correctly observed that the
strong deviation from the statewide distribution of power demonstrated
the opposite to be true and that Act 43 was a vehicle for partisan
gerrymandering.150
Moreover, the district court also emphasized that, because the election
results were present in this case, the issue of basing the discriminatory
effect on hypotheticals was not present, which had troubled members of
the Court in the past.151 Finally, use of EG by the plaintiffs as a
significant factor to support the claim that their representational rights
were burdened under Act 43 also demonstrated a significant and reliable
measure for effect not previously employed in such claims.152
e. Inclusion of the Efficiency Gap versus the Symmetry Standard
In the past, the Court hinted that a symmetry standard might be
acceptable for measuring partisan gerrymandering.153 The symmetry
standard measures partisan bias, and requires that similarly situated
political parties be treated the same by the electoral system.154 This
standard is satisfied when “a district plan does not discriminate between
the parties with respect to the conversion of votes to seats and vice
versa.”155
In LULAC, members of the Court expressed interest in the idea of a
symmetry standard.156 Justices Stevens was enthusiastic in his support of
the symmetry standard157 and Justice Souter also indicated that the
standard bore some usefulness and that further exploration was
warranted.158 Additionally, Justice Kennedy, though with a few
reservations, also showed openness to partisan symmetry as a measure
of partisan gerrymandering.159 However, after LULAC, the symmetry
standard was not asserted for partisan gerrymandering claims, despite
the Court’s seeming receptiveness to such a standard.160
The plaintiffs in Whitford did not rely on a symmetry standard, but
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419.
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 902.
Id. at 903.
Supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text; Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 903.
See generally LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419-20.
Id. at 466 (J. Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Stephanopoulos, supra note 85, at 843.
Id. at 842.
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 483-84 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Stephanopoulos, supra note 84, at 844-45.
Id. at 846.
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instead on the EG as an indicator of partisan gerrymandering. 161 While
the Supreme Court has expressed interest in the symmetry standard,162
the EG is superior to the symmetry standard as a measure of partisan
gerrymandering.163 Instead of requiring hypothetical election results, the
EG uses actual election results to calculate wasted votes.164 Proponents
of the EG argue that “[t]he efficiency gap provides exactly what litigants
and courts have long been missing: a reliable assessment of plans’
partisan implications.”165 Thus, the EG fixes the exact apprehension
expressed by Kennedy in LULAC as to the adoption of a partisan
symmetry standard; the danger of relying on hypothetical results to
determine if district gerrymandering took place.166
2. Why Traditional Tests for Partisan Gerrymandering May No Longer
Be Functional: Addressing the Pervasive Use of Technology in Partisan
Gerrymandering
Another advantage of the Whitford test is that it addresses the issue of
technology, specifically computers and computer software in the
drawing of redistricting maps. As previously mentioned, the defendants
in Whitford worked extensively with computer software and computer
generated models to create not only the most advantageous map, but one
that would also not offend traditionally acceptable districting criteria.167
One problem that the dissent in Whitford pointed out to the majority
opinion was that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how any of the
district lines created under Act 43 offended traditional redistricting
principles, such as compactness, continuity, and respect for political
boundaries.168 In fact, this was a defense that the defendants presented
for Act 43, “a redistricting plan that ‘is consistent with, and not a radical
departure from, prior plans with respect to traditional districting
principles’ cannot as a matter of law, evince an unconstitutional
intent.”169
However, the dissent in Whitford missed the important point that part
of the drafters’ intent behind Act 43 was specifically to avoid offending
traditional principles of districting and yet to enact a districting scheme
that would ensure the Republicans won any possible election scenario in
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 903.
See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
Stephanopoulos, supra note 84, at 896.
Id.
Id. at 868.
Id.at 896-97.
Supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text; supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 940 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
Id. at 888.
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the state.170 A takeaway from Whitford is that, in the computer age,
traditional districting criteria may be insufficient to identify when
discriminatory gerrymandering has taken place. Therefore, while
traditional indicators of permissible districts should not be disregarded,
physical indicators of gerrymandering can no longer be solely relied
upon as indicators of an intent to create partisan gerrymandering.
IV. CONCLUSION
Claims of partisan gerrymandering are unlikely to disappear on their
own and courts will likely continue to attempt resolution of such claims.
Finding a manageable standard is essential for the Court to deal with
these claims and the Court must deal with these claims. A continued
failure to articulate what is permissible in this area will allow further
exploitation of the Court’s contradicting articulations. Continued
inaction undermines the power of voters and the legitimacy of the
electoral system. As one news report noted, the real rigged voting
system is gerrymandering.171
The Whitford test presents a workable standard for which the Court
has been searching, and it even offers more. Whitford also addresses the
issue of computer districting and the failures of traditional districting
criteria, and it presents a standard for districting in the twenty-first
century that the Court can manage.

170. Supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
171. Despite tremendous dissatisfaction which Congress, ninety-seven percent of incumbents
were reelected to the House of Representative in the 2016 election, which critics cite as the results of
systematic gerrymandering. Sarah McCammon, Redistricting Reform Advocates Say the Real ‘Rigged
System’ is Gerrymandering, NPR, http://www.npr.org/2017/03/18/520551499/redistricting-reformadvocates-say-the-real-rigged-system-isgerrymandering?utm_source=npr_newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=20170318&utm_cam
paign=npr_email_a_friend&utm_term=storyshare (Mar. 18, 2017, 6:00 PM).
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